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Strategies for Privacy Negotiation in
Online Social Networks
Dilara Keku¨llu¨og˘lu1 and Nadin Ko¨kciyan2 and Pınar Yolum3
1 Introduction
Online social networks are changing the way information is
shared among individuals. Contrary to traditional Web sys-
tems, such as e-commerce Web sites, where information about
a user is managed solely by the user herself, in online social
networks other users can contribute to the content that is
shared about an individual. The shared content may reveal
information about the user, which the user might not wanted
to share herself. This creates a privacy breach on the user’s
side. In current online social networks, a common way to deal
with this is for the user to complain to the social network
administration and ask the content to be removed. However,
by the time the content is removed (if at all), many people
might have seen it already. Ideally, it would be best if such a
content was not shared in the ﬁrst place.
Recent work on privacy management has focused on apply-
ing agreement technologies to solve privacy problems before
they take place. Two important works in this line are that of
Mester et al. [3] and Such and Rovatsos [4]. These approaches
apply negotiation techniques [2] to resolve privacy conﬂicts
among users. They both consider negotiation before a content
is being shared. Both approaches assume that negotiation is
being performed on a single content and cannot account for
ongoing interactions. However, it has been observed that users
build reciprocal trust in online social networks and respect
others as much as others respect them. Hence, it is of utmost
importance to consider repeated interactions, as opposed to
single interactions, to study privacy leakages.
This paper proposes a multiagent management of privacy
in online social networks, where each user is represented by an
agent that helps its user preserve its privacy. The privacy of
users is preserved by a hybrid negotiation architecture where
privacy domain and rules are represented semantically but the
decision making is done by the agents using utility functions.
The paper develops various negotiation strategies including
one that exploits reciprocity. The key idea is that each agent
keeps track of whether a certain other user has been help-
ful before in preserving privacy using a credit system. When
agents help others in preserving their privacy, their credit in-
creases so that later they can ask others to help them. Hence,
helping others to preserve privacy serves as an incentive. Us-
ing these strategies, agents can negotiate on the content and
agree on how it will be shared before the post goes online.
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2 Negotiation Architecture
Our proposed negotiation architecture is based on semantic
representation of negotiation concepts and privacy rules, but
enables each agent to use its own utility functions to evaluate
negotiation oﬀers. We use PriNego [3] as the basis for the
semantic aspects of negotiation. PriNego proposes a nego-
tiation framework for privacy where each agent represents a
user in the social network. Each agent is aware of the privacy
concerns of its user but also has information about the social
network, such as the friends of the user. This information is
captured in an ontology that is represented in Web Ontology
Language (OWL).
Privacy Concerns: Each agent captures its user’s privacy
concerns as semantic rules (privacy rules) represented with a
Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) [1]. A privacy rule de-
scribes a situation wherein an agent would reject a particular
negotiation oﬀer. Consider a user Alice who does not want
her colleagues to see her pictures within a leisure context. If
Alice herself was sharing a picture in a leisure context, she
or her agent can enforce that the audience of a post is set so
that colleagues are not included. However, if Bob, a friend of
Alice is about to share such a content, then it is diﬃcult to
enforce Alice’s privacy constraint on Bob’s content.
Negotiation: In such a setting, Alice and Bob’s agents can
negotiate among each other to decide if the content should
be shared and if so, under which constraints. Following the
above example, if Bob asks Alice to share a post in leisure
context, then Alice’s agent would reject this regarding Alice’s
privacy rule. Our proposed system enables agents to provide
a rejection reason as well (e.g., rejected because of context). If
a negotiation oﬀer does not violate any of the privacy rules of
the user, then the agent accepts this oﬀer. For example, if Bob
would ask Alice to share a post in work context, then Alice’s
agent would accept this oﬀer. A user might have various pri-
vacy constraints but these might not be equally important. To
capture the fact that a rule is more important than a second
rule, we associate a weight with each rule.
Decision Making: When an agent creates an oﬀer, the eval-
uations done to decide whether to accept an oﬀer as well as to
create a new counter-oﬀer constitute the negotiation strategy
of an agent. Here, we require each agent to have a utility func-
tion, which is based on the privacy concerns of the user. The
utility value of a post request (negotiation oﬀer) considers the
threshold value set by the user agent as well. An agent makes
a decision about a post request regarding its utility function.
The agent that initiates the negotiation (i.e., initiator) will
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have a diﬀerent utility function than an agent that negoti-
ates for her privacy (i.e., negotiator) since both agents have
diﬀerent responsibilities during negotiation.
• A negotiator agent is responsible for evaluating a post re-
quest and making a decision about this post request based
on its utility. In case where it wants to reject it, it may also
provide rejection reason(s) depending on the strategy that
it follows.
• An initiator agent is responsible for initializing the negoti-
ation with other agents (i.e., agents that are relevant to a
post request). Then, it collects responses from other agents.
If all agents agree on sharing the post request, then it shares
the post. Otherwise, it will try to update the post request
according to its utility and rejection reasons of others. As
a result of this, it can choose to share the post, continue or
terminate the ongoing negotiation.
3 Strategies for Privacy Negotiation
We have developed three negotiation strategies that agents
can use.
Good-Enough-Privacy (GEP): In this strategy, the ini-
tiator agent sends a post request to relevant agents. At each
iteration, each agent provides a rejection reason if it rejects
the post request. For this, each agent evaluates a post request
by computing a utility. If this utility is above the agent’s util-
ity threshold, then the agent accepts the post request as it
is. Otherwise, the agent ﬁnds its most important rule then it
rejects the post request and provides the corresponding rejec-
tion reason.
Maximal-Privacy (MP): GEP strategy sends only one
rule per iteration. However, the initiator agent may be will-
ing to revise the post request by considering multiple rejec-
tion reasons. Hence, the negotiation could terminate in fewer
iterations. For example, the initiator agent might want the
negotiation to be over in two rounds, and an agent relevant
to the post request might have three rules that are violated.
The initiator agent may be actually ready to prevent all these
violations. If the negotiator agent uses GEP strategy, then at
most two rejection reasons can be considered. In MP, an agent
will send all rejections reasons to the initiator agent. If the ini-
tiator agent rejects the post request, then the negotiator agent
will start narrowing the set of rejection reasons by removing
rejection reasons that are less important than others.
For GEP and MP, the outcome of the negotiation is only
determined by considering the current situation and ignoring
the previous interactions.
Reciprocal Strategy (RP): The outcome of a negotiation
is beneﬁcial for all the negotiating agents; however one party
is usually better than the others. This diﬀerence might be
insigniﬁcant for many negotiations. The diﬀerence may get
disadvantageous for the others if one party is favored most of
the times. To prevent this, we propose a new strategy based
on reciprocity called Reciprocal Strategy (RP). In this strat-
egy, agents negotiate regarding the previous behaviors and
negotiations. If one party is favored more in previous nego-
tiations, then this strategy tries to favor the other party. To
keep track of the previous negotiations, we use a point-based
system where both parties have the same amount of points in
the initial state (e.g., each 5pts). For every negotiation, agents
exchange points depending on who is the initiator and how
much beneﬁt they get from that negotiation.
At every negotiation iteration, the initiator agent sends the
post request together with a point oﬀer to the negotiator
agent. In the previous strategies, the negotiator agent was
calculating a utility per post request, and if this utility was
below its utility threshold, it would send a rejection reason.
In this strategy, agents also consider point oﬀers of each other
while computing their utilities. Hence, they try to compensate
the utility shortage by the points that they get from others.
If the computed utility is below the threshold, the negotiator
agent asks the initiator agent for suﬃcient points to accept
the post request. Otherwise, the negotiator agent accepts the
post request as it is.
Since the negotiations in this strategy change depending
on the previous interactions, the eﬀects of RP should be cap-
tured observing continuous posting. We have tested our sys-
tem with consecutive postings. In order to understand how
posting habits of the people aﬀect the outcome of the negoti-
ation, we have tried diﬀerent cases. To see how these posting
habits aﬀect the resulting utilities, we have considered various
cases for two users: (i) one user shares a post, (ii) both users
share posts regularly.
4 Future Directions
An important ﬁrst step is to evaluate these strategies in com-
parison to each other. This comparison should take into ac-
count various factors such as overall points, time constraints,
number of posts to be shared and so on.
As a second step, it is worthwhile to incorporate trust re-
lations into the utility functions such that agents are more
willing to cooperate with those that they trust. This would re-
ﬂect real life relations more closely. Another important point
is to enable the negotiation framework to be updated such
that privacy rule weights can be learned over time.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work has been supported by TUBITAK.
REFERENCES
[1] Ian Horrocks, Peter F Patel-Schneider, Harold Boley, Said
Tabet, Benjamin Grosof, Mike Dean, et al., ‘SWRL: A seman-
tic web rule language combining OWL and RuleML’, World
Wide Web Consortium Member submission, 21, 79, (2004).
[2] N. R. Jennings, A. R. Lomuscio P. Faratin, S. Parsons,
C. Sierra, and M. Wooldridge, ‘Automated negotiation:
Prospects, methods and challenges’, International Journal of
Group Decision and Negotiation, 10(2), 199–215, (2001).
[3] Yavuz Mester, Nadin Ko¨kciyan, and Pınar Yolum, ‘Negotiat-
ing privacy constraints in online social networks’, in Advances
in Social Computing and Multiagent Systems, eds., Fernando
Koch, Christian Guttmann, and Didac Busquets, volume 541 of
Communications in Computer and Information Science, 112–
129, Springer International Publishing, (2015).
[4] Jose M. Such and Michael Rovatsos, ‘Privacy policy negotia-
tion in social media’, ACM Transactions on Autonomous and
Adaptive Systems (TAAS), 11(1), 4:1–4:29, (2016).
D. Keküllüog˘lu et al. / Strategies for Privacy Negotiation in Online Social Networks 1609
